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CONCLUSION
It appears settled, then, that Chapter 506 presents no significant procedur-
al due process problems. Due process in condemnation proceedings does not
entitle the condemnee to a prior determination of the right to take, or the
proper extent of the taking, before title to and possession of condemned
property vests in the condemnor. Due process is afforded the property owner
if he is given the opportunity to be heard on the amount of damages he has
incurred by the taking-the propriety or extent of taking being purely
legislative determinations.
The infirmities of existing condemnation procedures available to
municipalities substantially inhere in the multiplicity of procedures to which
such condemnors have access. All North Carolina municipalities condemn
basically for similar purposes, and the condemnation procedure used should
be uniform for all. Local legislation granting authority to condemn for
special purposes should speak to just that, the authority to condemn, and not
to the procedure by which the authority is effectuated. Consistency and
uniformity are much needed characteristics of North Carolina condemnation
law; and it is to this end that the North Carolina Legislature should direct its
attention.
Seemingly, so long as health is not cited in a Chapter 506 condemnation,
for whatever reason, no other state constitutional problems arise. However,
a great service would be done for all North Carolina municipalities having
authority to use the provisions of Article 9 of Chapter 136, if North Carolina
courts would offer some dispositive reasoning, on the Article II Section 24
question raised in Manson, other than a bare and unsupported pronounce-
ment of the invalidity of the argument. Until such time, local condemnees
must formulate a definition of health by way of analogy to existing cases, no
matter how confusing, in order to assure at least a facsimile of uniformity
throughout the state.
CALVIN E. MURPHY
Article 50: Legislative Delegation to Private Agricultural Groups
In 1947, the North Carolina General Assembly declared that it was in the
interest of the public welfare, that North Carolina farmers, producing
livestock, poultry, field crops and other agricultural products, be permitted
and encouraged to act jointly and in cooperation with dealers of such
products, in promoting and stimulating, by advertising and other methods,
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ARTICLE 50
the increased production, use and sale of all such agricultural commodities. 1
The legislature further declared it to be in the public interest and highly
advantageous to the agricultural economy of the State that farmers, produc-
ers and growers producing the commodities named in the Act, be permitted,
by an election to be held among groups composed of persons producing such
agricultural commodities, to levy upon themselves an assessment on such
commodities. The purpose of the assessment was the financing of a program
of advertising and other methods designed to increase the consumption of,
and the domestic as well as foreign markets for, such agricultural products. 2
In order to carry out this express legislative purpose, the legislature
authorizes any private organization fairly representative of the growers and
producers of any agricultural commodity to apply to the North Carolina
Department of Agriculture for certification and approval for the purpose of
conducting a referendum, among the growers or producers of such particular
agricultural commodity, upon the question of levying an assessment, for the
purpose of contributing to an advertising program designed to increase the
consumption of such agricultural products.' Upon certification, such organi-
zation is authorized and empowered to conduct, either on a statewide or area
basis, a referendum on the question of whether or not such growers and
producers shall levy upon themselves an annual assessment.4 All farmers
engaged in the production of such an agricultural commodity on a commer-
cial basis may participate, 5 and the certified organization is authorized to fix
the amount of the assessment; it cannot exceed one-half of one percent of
the value of the year's production of such product grown by any farmer. 6 If
two-thirds or more in the area in which the vote is conducted approve, such
assessment is collected by the agency. 7 Should the assessment be levied and
collected, by such organization, any farmer or producer against whom such
assessment is levied may demand and receive from the organization a refund
of the assessment; provided the demand is made in writing within 30 days
from the date on which said assessment is collected. The Act also specifies,
that as to growers or producers of apples there shall be, on and after July 1,
1972, no right of refund of assessments.8
Article 50 is, for two reasons, probably invalid. First, it delegates to
producers and growers of agricultural commodities the authority to decide
whether an assessment shall be levied upon themselves, without also provid-
ing adequate standards and guidelines to such agricultural growers and
producers, to determine if such assessment shall be levied. In other words, it
I. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-550(1975).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-555(1975).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-554(1975).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-556(1975).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-559(1975).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-557(1975).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-561(1975).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-567(1975).
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gives to agricultural groups the authority to determine what the law shall be,
and this constitutes a delegation of legislative authority to private individu-
als, and is in violation of article I, section six, and article II, section one, of
the North Carolina Constitution. Secondly, the article confers such authority
on private agricultural organizations without also holding these agricultural
organizations accountable for their actions.
The separation of powers doctrine affords an obstacle to delegation of
power ". . . only insofar as the constitution of a particular state may
require such separation," 9 and the North Carolina rule on the delegation of
legislative authority is based on two controlling provisions of the North
Carolina Constitution. Article I, section six, states that the legislative,
executive, and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other, and article II, section one,
provides that the legislative power of the state shall be vested in the General
Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
Relying on these two constitutional provisions, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has repeatedly stated that the legislature may not delegate its
legislative power, except to municipal corporations.' 0 In In re Annexation
Ordinances, the court stated: "It is a settled principle of fundamental law,
inherent in our constitutional separation of government into three depart-
ments and the assignment of the lawmaking function exclusively to the
legislative department, that . . . the Legislature may not abdicate its power
to make laws or delegate its supreme legislative power to any other depart-
ment or body."" 1 Thus, the legislature may neither delegate its legislative
authority to a private organization, nor to an administrative agency of the
government. 
12
However, the supreme court has, in fact permitted, at least with respect to
state administrative agencies, delegation of authority. The delegation, how-
ever, is not the authority to make a law, and thereby invade the legislative
function. It is the conferring of authority as the execution of the law.
This distinction between the conferring of the lawmaking function, and the
authority as to the execution of the law, was pointed out in Coastal Highway
v. Turnpike Authority, where the court stated:
Since legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involv-
ing numerous details with which the legislature cannot deal directly,
the constitutional inhibition against delegating legislative authority
does not deny to the legislature the necessary flexibility of enabling
9. 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 45(1965).
10. In re Annexation Ordinances, 253 N.C. 637, 117 S.E.2d 795 (1961); State ex rel. Tillett
v. Mustian, 243 N.C. 564,91 S.E.2d 696 (1956); Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Turnpike
Auth., 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310 (1953).
11. 253 N.C. 637, 644-55, 117 S.E.2d 795, 800-01(1961).
12. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206
S.E.2d 141(1974).
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ARTICLE 50
it to lay down policies and establish standards, while leaving to
designated governmental agencies and administrative boards the
determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legisla-
ture shall apply. Provision Company v. Davies, supra. Without this
power, the Legislature would often be placed in the awkward situa-
tion of possessing a power over a given subject without being able to
exercise it. Here we pause to note the distinction generally recog-
nized between a delegation of the power to make a law, which
necessarily includes a discretion as to what it shall be, and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to its execution. The first
may not be done, whereas the latter, if adequate guiding standards
are laid down, is permissible under certain circumstances. 11 Am.
Jurs., Constitutional Law, Sec. 234. See also Pue v. Hood, Com'r of
Banks, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896."3
Thus, the rules for delegating authority are strict. The court will allow the
legislature to delegate authority to a state administrtive agency, as long as it
gives the agency adequate standards. More specifically, "[t]he legislative
body must declare the policy of the law, fix legal principles which are to
control . . .and provide adequate standards for the guidance of the ad-
ministrative body or officer empowered to execute the law."' 14 The dele-
gated authority allows discretion as to the execution of the law; not discre-
tion as to the making of the law. There are the requirements that must be met
by the general assembly in conferring authority upon a state agency.
If the general assembly can confer authority on governmental agencies, as
described above, the question arises as to whether in North Carolina, the
same authority can be conferred on private organizations and private indi-
viduals. If such authority can be conferred, the related question arises, as to
whether the legislature, in delegating the authority, must adhere to the
requirements mandated by the supreme court for conferring authority on
governmental agencies.
Apparently, although no case could be found directly on point, the
legislature can delegate, to private organizations and individuals, the author-
ity or discretion as to the execution of the law if it establishes the proper
standards for so doing as mandated by the supreme court. Bulova Watch
Co. v. Brand Distrib. of North Wilkesboro, 15 where the constitutionality of
the North Carolina Fair Trade Act was at issue, impliedly supports such a
conclusion. Under this Act, the producer of any article bearing its trademark
or trade name could, if it desired, make a contract with a single retailer in
North Carolina. Under the contract, the retailer would, upon his own sales,
charge the retail price set by the producer. He could then give notice of such
contract to all other retailers in the state and thereby cause it to be unlawful
13. 237 N.C. 52, 60-61, 74 S.E.2d 310(1952).
14. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467,475, 206
S.E.2d 141, 147 (1974).
15. Id.
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for such other retailers thereafter to sell, at prices satisfactory to them and to
their customers, such articles lawfully acquired by them.' 6 The price was
subject to change by the producer at will, from time to time, with no right in
any retailer to be heard by anyone.' 7 The court ruled that, since the
legislature could not vest in a government agency the power to apply or
withhold the application of the law in its absolute or unguided discretion, it
necessarily followed that the legislature may not vest in a private corpora-
tion the authority to determine in its absolute or unguided discretion the
price at which another, with whom it has no contractual relationship, may
sell to a willing buyer an article lawfully acquired and owned by him. 8 The
infirmity was apparently not that the legislature had delegated legislative
powers to a corporation, but that the authority had not been delegated in
accordance with supreme court guidelines. The legislature, in passing the
Fair Trade Agreement, had not declared the policy of the law, fixed legal
principles to control in given cases, and provided adequate standards for the
guidance of private corporations empowered to execute the law. Presum-
ably, had the Fair Trade Act been written to conform to these standards, the
legislature could have thereby conferred authority on private organizations.
In at least one admittedly vintage decision,' 9 the North Carolina Supreme
Court has unequivocally stated that private organizations may be delegated
authority. In fact, the court stated:
Neither is it necessary for us to consider the general question
whether the General Assembly can delegate Any portion of its legis-
lative functions to any man or set of men, acting in an individual or
corporate capacity. That it may, has been too long settled and
acquiesced in . . . to be now disputed or even discussed.20
The court further noted that the "General Assembly must have, and are
universally conceded to have, the power to act by means of agents, which
agents may be either individuals or political bodies; most generally the
latter.' 21
Therefore, assuming that the legislature may delegate authority to private
bodies if in drawing any such statute, it adheres to the requirements set
down by the supreme court for delegating authority to governmental agen-
cies, there may yet arise another objection to giving a private body such
authority. That objection is, that while governmental agencies are created by
the legislature and accountable to the state for their actions, private agencies
are formed by private persons for a private purpose, and may be neither
accountable for their actions to the state, nor to their members. If a private
16. Id.
17. Id. at 476, 206 S.E.2d at 148.
18. Id. at 475, 206 S.E.2d at 147.
19. Thompson v. Floyd, 47 N.C. 313, 315(1855).
20. Id. at 315.
21. Id. at 316.
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ARTICLE 50
organization is not accountable to the state, yet delegated authority by the
legislature, the supreme court might find that the delegation is improper.
Assuming that private groups as well as governmental agencies can be
delegated authority, and that the test of whether that delegation to private
groups is lawful is whether or not the legislature has declared the policy of
the law, fixed legal principles which are to control in given cases, and
provided adequate standards for the guidance of the organization, article 50,
which confers authority to private organizations, must therefore conform to
these standards, or else it unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority.
Article 50, however, does not conform to these standards. It neither ade-
quately fixes the legal principles which are to control in given cases nor
provides adequate standards for the guidance of the organization.
The article 22 allows any commission, council, board, or other agency
fairly representative of the growers and producers of designated agricultural
commodities to apply to the Board of Agriculture of the State of North
Carolina, for certification. Yet, the Act does not define what "fairly repre-
sentative" means; the agricultural group has no way of knowing, and has to
make its own decision as to the meaning of this term. Hence the agency is,
by deciding which agricultural groups are fairly representative, effectively
making law. Furthermore, the Board of Agriculture must certify the private
organization, if it is "fairly representative" of the growers of a particular
commodity. 23 The Board, however, is given no guidance in the statute for
determining if an organization is "fairly representative"; in fact, the Board
can, in its absolute or unguided discretion, deny or grant certification to any
group/ 4
Once certified, the private agency may, or may not, conduct an election
to determine if an assessment should be levied.25 In other words, the
decision is left to the organization's absolute discretion.
These few examples do not comprise a total list of the article's shortcom-
ings. Yet they constitute enough proof on which the supreme court might
base a decision that the article is invalid.
Article 50 may also be invalid because it confers authority on private
organizations, without also holding them accountable for their actions. This
weakness was pointed out shortly after article 50 was enacted:
These agencies instead of being created by the legislature, are form-
ed by private persons for a private purpose, and they do not have to
account for actions or expenditures, either to the state or to the
coerced contributors. There is no direct or indirect benefit guaran-
teed to the individual assessed, nor is there any guarantee of the
continued existence of these private associations. There are no
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-554(1975).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-555(1975).
24. Id.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-556(1975).
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express sanctions against incompetence and dishonesty, such as
ordinarily give a considerable measure of control over the activities
of public officials. Further, . . . whether there will be any referenda
and consequent assessments is left to the discretion of these private
agencies; and . . . there is a serious question as to whether the
agency can be compelled to act.16
A lack of accountability, such as exists in article 50, has been a major
factor in the judiciary's striking down legislative delegations to private
organizations. Thus, "[W]here a legislature undertakes to vest legislative
• . . powers in a body dominated by self-interested groups, the courts
understandably are loathe to tolerate the delegation of any broad discretion-
ary powers, for fear they will be exercised not in the public interest, but
rather in the private interests of those who have an axe to grind."27
Unless article 50 is amended so as to make private organizations or
individuals, like governmental agencies to which authority is delegated,
accountable for their actions, the supreme court is likely to find article 50
invalid.
CONCLUSION
This statutory note has focused on the constitutional pitfalls involved in
delegating legislative authority to private organizations, as opposed to
government agencies; and more specifically, it has pointed out the constitu-
tional debilities of article 50. If the legislature had written the article in a
manner so as to delegate authority to a government agency, instead of to a
private organization, at least the Act would be cured of one infirmity; the
agency would be accountable to the state. Without at least some accounta-
bility, the article is not likely to withstand a constitutional challenge.
So far, the constitutionality of article 50 has gone untested; probably as a
result of the provision in the Act which allows a farmer or producer, if he so
elects, to recover the assessment after it has been levied.28 Presumably, no
one who could get his money back would be interested in pursuing a lawsuit
to test the article. However, the article may well be challenged in the near
future, by disgruntled growers or producers of apples. The Act states that
"on and after July 1, 1972, as to growers or producers of apples there shall
be no right of refund of assessments levied pursuant to the referendum
provided for by Article 50, Chapter 106.' '29 Perhaps the legislature can
change the Act before the test comes.
JAMES R. RICH
26. Constitutional Law-Assessments on Agricultural Products, A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1947, 25 N.C.L. REV. 399(1948).
27. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 9, at 84.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-567(1975).
29. Id.
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